The June 5 Blackout And Someone's Nuclear Imaginings
By Dennis A. Minott, PhD
June 15, 2026

The electrical grid, let alone a nuclear power plant, does not respond to speeches.
It responds to engineering, operational discipline, highly competent technicians, and robust systems that perform reliably twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
That is why Jamaica's island-wide blackout of June 5 deserves to be examined not merely as an inconvenience, but as a diagnostic event. It revealed important truths about the present state of our electricity system and, in so doing, cast a harsh light on the renewed enthusiasm in some quarters for introducing nuclear power, particularly Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), into Jamaica's energy future.
Far from strengthening the case for nuclear energy, the blackout demonstrated why Jamaica should proceed with extreme caution.
The central issue is not generation capacity.
The June 5 outage was not caused by a shortage of fuel or by an inability to generate electricity. It was, rather, a failure of resilience within a highly interconnected system. The event exposed vulnerabilities in transmission, distribution, protection systems, automation, operational governance, and recovery capability.
These are precisely the areas that would need to be exceptionally strong before any nuclear facility could be responsibly integrated into Jamaica's electricity network.
Nuclear reactors, including SMRs, are not ordinary generating units. They are designed to operate within highly stable and exceptionally reliable grid environments. Although advocates frequently portray SMRs as an ideal solution for Small Island Developing States, the engineering realities are considerably less accommodating.
Nuclear facilities are most efficient when operating at relatively constant output. They are not particularly forgiving of severe grid instability. If significant faults occur within a weak network, protective systems may require the reactor to shut down safely.
That is exactly what those systems are designed to do.
However, unlike a conventional generating unit, restarting a nuclear reactor is not a simple matter. The process can be lengthy, procedurally demanding, and heavily regulated. Consequently, a transmission disturbance that might otherwise be manageable could become a far more serious operational challenge.
In short, an ultra-reliable grid is a prerequisite for nuclear energy; nuclear energy does not create one.
This brings us to the much-celebrated promise of Small Modular Reactors themselves.
Despite considerable publicity, SMRs remain majorly unproven commercially. Numerous designs exist. Numerous promises have been made. Yet relatively few units--less than fingers to count on one hand--are operating globally, and many projects have experienced delays, escalating costs, or outright cancellation. The widely publicized NuScale Carbon Free Power Project in Idaho ultimately collapsed under the weight of rising projected costs—which surged to US$9.3 billion. The termination occurred despite a US$1.4 billion U.S. government funding pledge, of which roughly US$600 million in taxpayer funds had already been spent. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
For Jamaica, this raises a fundamental question.
Why should a small developing country become dependent upon a technology that even wealthy industrial nations are still struggling to commercialise successfully?
The economics are equally troubling.
While every nuclear facility mandates strict regulation, security, environmental oversight, and specialized training, the scale of emergency preparedness varies heavily by design, and high-level waste management requires isolation spanning hundreds of thousands of years.
A nation operating a nuclear facility must maintain a competent and independent regulatory authority. It must provide specialised, military-grade security arrangements. It must prepare for contingencies that may never occur but whose consequences could be severe.

These costs do not disappear simply because the reactor is smaller.
Whether the plant generates 1,000 megawatts or 60 megawatts, much of the regulatory and security overhead remains. For a country of Jamaica's size, those costs would inevitably be reflected in electricity prices.
Then there is the matter of geography.
Jamaica lies within the intensely active Plantain Garden-Enriquillo seismic region and directly within the disaster-plagued Atlantic hurricane belt. Modern nuclear engineers rightly point out that reactors can be designed to withstand significant natural hazards. That is true.
Yet Fukushima taught the world an important lesson. Complex systems fail not merely because of a single event, but because multiple events can overwhelm assumptions embedded within the design.
Even if a Jamaican SMR survived a major hurricane intact, the transmission and distribution infrastructure connecting it to consumers might not.
A generating plant, however sophisticated, serves little purpose if the lines carrying its electricity are down.
The June 5 blackout reminds us that grid resilience matters every bit as much as generation.
That reality points toward a different strategic direction.
For decades, Jamaica has possessed indigenous renewable energy opportunities that remain underdeveloped. The pioneering work undertaken by ENERPLAN and later Verde Siempre demonstrated the technical feasibility of biomass, biogas, small hydro, and integrated renewable energy systems. That work received international recognition, including a Rockefeller Foundation award, yet much of its promise remains unrealised.
Today, those earlier efforts can be complemented by modern solar photovoltaics, utility-scale battery storage, wind power, smart controls, and distributed microgrids.
Such systems offer an advantage that large centralised generating stations cannot easily match: resilience.
When distributed generation is combined with battery storage, communities can continue operating even when parts of the wider grid experience difficulties. Hospitals, water systems, telecommunications facilities, and critical public services can be protected through localised "islanding" capability.
Instead of concentrating risk in a single facility, distributed systems spread both generation and resilience across the network.
Equally important, renewable energy systems can be deployed incrementally. Additional capacity can be installed year by year, technology can be upgraded continuously, and investment can be scaled to match economic realities.

Nuclear projects, by contrast, typically require enormous upfront commitments, lengthy approval processes, and long development timelines before a single kilowatt-hour reaches consumers.
The lesson of June 5 is therefore neither obscure nor complicated.
To be clear, this is not an argument that nuclear energy is inherently impossible, irrational, or technologically unsound. Several advanced economies have successfully integrated nuclear power into highly reliable electricity systems. The question is not whether nuclear energy can work somewhere. The question is whether it represents Jamaica's wisest, least RIOC, priority now.
Jamaica's most urgent energy challenges do not lie in the pursuit of technological prestige. They lie in strengthening the fundamentals: grid modernisation, system resilience, battery storage, operational excellence, distributed generation, and intelligent network management.
The blackout was a signal.
We should listen carefully.
Signals matter because they reveal the true location of a problem. The June 5 outage pointed not to a shortage of exotic generation technologies but to weaknesses within the network that delivers electricity to homes, businesses, hospitals, and critical national infrastructure.
For Jamaica, the path to energy security is not through nuclear imaginings or billion-dollar mirages. It is through mastering the engineering fundamentals while harnessing the abundant sunshine, wind, biomass, water resources, and ingenuity that we already possess.
The electrical grid, let alone a FOAK nuclear power plant, does not respond to speeches. It responds to engineering. Jamaica's energy future should do likewise.
%202021_edited_edited.jpg)







Comments