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Slow-Marching on One Square: How Executive Laziness and ‘Weevils in the Rice’ Are Undermining Jamaica’s Post-Melissa Recovery

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By Dennis A Minott, PhD

November 18, 2026


In the disciplined choreography of the parade square, there is an exercise known to every recruit who has ever worn a uniform: marking time—or, in the vernacular of the Caribbean barrack room, slow-marching on one square. It is a display of immaculate posture, crisp cadence, and undeniable visual authority. The boots strike the tarmac in unison; the creases in the tunics remain razor-sharp; the illusion of purposeful motion is complete. Yet when the dust settles and the bugle fades, nobody has advanced a single chain.


For the better part of a decade, successive Cabinets led by Prime Minister Dr Andrew Holness have elevated this parade-ground illusion into a governing philosophy. Whenever a civilian institution falters—whether through bureaucratic inertia, corruption, or the sheer, terrifying scale of a national emergency—the reflex at Jamaica House has become wholly predictable. Rather than doing the patient, unglamorous work of reforming civilian systems, empowering career specialists, or building institutional resilience from within, the executive branch reaches instinctively for the officer corps of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF).


Let us be entirely clear from the outset, lest this critique be misread as an attack upon the men and women who serve under our colours: Jamaica is extraordinarily fortunate in the calibre of its military leadership. Having spent years immersed in the rhythms of military life and having viewed Caribbean disaster operations up close through decades of marriage to Sandra Minott—a fellow scientist and educator whose professional life had been deeply woven into the planning, direction, and execution of pre- and post-disaster management across the region—I harbour profound respect for the intellect, integrity, and organisational discipline of our senior officers. They are, by and large, bright, dedicated patriots.


Precisely because they are patriots, however, they deserve better than to be treated as an all-purpose administrative sticking plaster by a Cabinet too intellectually indolent to govern civilian institutions properly. When political leaders summarily assign complex civilian mandates to serving or retired soldiers without equipping them with the statutory frameworks, forensic accounting systems, or specialist civilian teams those mandates require, they are not honouring the military. They are setting good officers up to take the fall for civilian governance failures, whilst simultaneously starving the civil service of the leadership and succession it desperately needs.


And as the Auditor General’s sobering November 2026 report on the post-Hurricane Melissa relief effort has just demonstrated, this habit of substituting military cadence for civilian institutional rigour carries a steep, literal cost.


The Illusion of Immediate Efficiency

To understand why the Holness administrations have grown so reliant on military appointments, one must appreciate the political seduction of the uniform. Civilian institutional reform is slow, contentious, and rarely yields immediate photo opportunities. Rebuilding procurement controls, modernising warehouse inventory software, training municipal disaster coordinators, and enforcing statutory compliance require years of unglamorous administrative labour.


By contrast, appointing a Major General, a Rear Admiral, a Lieutenant General, or a Naval Commander to head a troubled civilian entity, projects instant decisiveness. Over the years, we have watched this template applied across the state apparatus: Major General Antony Anderson and Rear Admiral Hardley Lewin at the Jamaica Constabulary Force; Major General Stewart Saunders at the Ministry of National Security, MOCA, and the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM); Colonel Daniel Pryce at PICA and ODPEM; and, in a constitutional misstep that only public and legal pushback averted in 2022, the proposed elevation of Lieutenant General Rocky Meade—the JDF’s first-ever three-star Chief of Defence Staff—directly to the apex of the civilian bureaucracy as Cabinet Secretary.


In the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Melissa, the Category 5 tempest that battered Jamaica on October 28, 2025, that same reflex asserted itself once again. Days after the storm passed, in early November 2025, the Prime Minister announced in Parliament the reassignment of ODPEM from its traditional ministerial home directly into the Office of the Prime Minister, alongside the secondment of JDF Commander Alvin Gayle as Director General. The rationale offered to the nation was textbook executive pragmatism: establishing a single point for emergency logistics and tightening coordination with the JDF, which already falls under the Prime Minister’s portfolio.


At the time, seasoned disaster specialists—including former ODPEM Director General Dr Barbara Carby—warned that subsuming the statutory agency into Jamaica House risked eroding its institutional independence. Those warnings were brushed aside in favour of what the administration hailed as streamlined operational efficiency.


Twelve months later, the Auditor General’s findings have laid bare the difference between military logistics and civilian fiduciary accountability.


When ‘Efficiency’ Permits Weevils in the Rice

There is an old Jamaican adage—one that carries particular resonance in the wake of a hurricane—about what happens when grain is stored without proper ventilation, inspection, and rotation: weevils get into the rice. You may guard the warehouse perimeter with armed sentries; you may move convoys with military precision; you may issue crisp daily briefings from Jamaica House. Yet if the civilian inventory controls inside the depot are defective, if first-in-first-out stock rotation is absent, and if donation ledgers are not reconciled against physical pallets, rot will consume the harvest from within.


The Auditor General’s report tabled this week reads like a clinical diagnosis of precisely that phenomenon. While acknowledging the extraordinary pressures following Hurricane Melissa, the audit uncovered expired food items, insect-infested relief supplies, unopened shipping containers awaiting reconciliation more than a year after landfall, and millions of dollars in donated goods and building materials whose receipt and distribution could not be independently verified. Most glaringly, the audit flagged a nearly $200 million discrepancy in roofing materials alone—where correspondence from the Office of the Prime Minister in July 2026 cited $400 million in received building materials, whilst ODPEM’s own donation schedule days later listed roughly $203.1 million.


Let us pause and examine the anatomy of this failure, because it illustrates the central thesis of our governance malaise. Nobody who understands the calibre of JDF officers believes for a moment that Commander Gayle or his military colleagues set out to mismanage relief supplies; indeed, ODPEM itself has rightly referred unresolved inventory inconsistencies to external law-enforcement investigators. Rather, what the audit exposes is the fatal flaw in the Cabinet’s governing theory.

Military command is built for rapid kinetic execution: seizing ground, clearing arterial roads, establishing communications, and moving tonnage from port to parish under austere conditions. In those spheres, the JDF is unmatched across the Commonwealth Caribbean. Civilian humanitarian management, however, is a fundamentally different discipline. It is governed by statutory public-finance regulations, multi-agency donor reporting protocols, forensic supply-chain auditing, perishable-goods shelf-life tracking, and community-level vulnerability verification.


When a Cabinet parachutes a military officer into the top chair of a civilian agency—and simultaneously relocates that agency into the political orbit of the Prime Minister’s Office—without first fixing the broken civilian accounting and warehousing architecture beneath him, it creates a dangerous blind spot. The administration mistakes the arrival of a uniformed commander for the arrival of a functioning system. Under the banner of "cutting red tape" and achieving "operational speed," routine civilian checks and balances are treated as bureaucratic inconveniences—until the Auditor General arrives twelve months later and finds weevils in the rice.


Lessons Forgotten from the Era of Civilian Mastery

What makes this institutional regression so frustrating is that Jamaica once possessed—and helped pioneer for the entire Caribbean—the gold standard of civilian disaster governance.

Those of us who lived through Hurricane Gilbert in September 1988, or who have studied the evolution of regional emergency management alongside practitioners who built it, remember a very different institutional culture. In the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, Jamaica’s emergency apparatus was led by civilian technical specialists of international standing: figures such as Franklin McDonald and Dr Barbara Carby. They were earth scientists, planners, and public administrators who understood that disaster management does not begin when a tropical wave crosses the Lesser Antilles, nor does it end when the last tarpaulin is handed out.


Under that civilian-primacy doctrine—a doctrine enshrined across CARICOM through the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) and its Comprehensive Disaster Management framework—roles were cleanly and wisely delineated. Civilian scientists and emergency managers controlled hazard mapping, building-code advocacy, parish-level disaster committees, shelter management, and humanitarian supply-chain accounting. The JDF played an indispensable, heroic role, but it operated strictly as an operational logistics and engineering arm subordinated to civilian incident command.


That division of labour was not born of mistrust of the military; it was born of institutional wisdom. It recognised that soldiers train for command, security, and rapid deployment, whereas civilian disaster professionals train for long-term risk reduction, regulatory compliance, and social recovery. Look, by way of parallel, at what transpired in the Jamaica Constabulary Force when leadership transitioned from a former Chief of Defence Staff back to a civilian career specialist in Commissioner Dr Kevin Blake: measurable, structural shifts in crime-fighting strategy emerged precisely because civilian policing and military soldiering are distinct professions requiring distinct toolkits.


By abandoning that hard-won separation at ODPEM and treating disaster management primarily as an exercise in military logistics, the Holness Cabinet has weakened both sides of the equation. It has sidelined a generation of career civilian disaster planners and parish coordinators, signalling to young Jamaican scientists, logisticians, and public administrators that no matter how diligently they master their craft, the summit of their profession will always be reserved for a retired or seconded officer from Up Park Camp.


Accountability That Arrives Too Late

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this pattern is what happens when the inevitable audit findings surface. In his post-Cabinet press briefing on November 18, 2026, Commander Gayle assured the country that ODPEM can account for the monies received for Hurricane Melissa recovery, whilst acknowledging longstanding systemic issues and committing to new expiry registers, stock counts, and shipment reconciliations by the end of December 2026.


One welcomes those commitments, just as one welcomes the referral of missing items to investigators. Yet any seasoned observer of public administration must ask: why were basic expiry registers, physical stock-count protocols, and reconciled donation schedules only being instituted in late 2026, more than a year after a foreseeable Category 5 hurricane struck our shores?


This is where the administration’s reliance on military appointees quietly morphs into a political shield. When a career civil servant or a political appointee presides over warehouse spoilage and unverified donation ledgers, public outrage is swift and uncompromising. When a respected military officer stands at the podium—calm, articulate, steeped in the dignified cadence of service—the national instinct is to extend grace. We are invited to view the lapses as unfortunate growing pains inherited from a broken bureaucracy, and to trust that order will be restored by year-end.


Grace is a noble Christian virtue, and on a personal level, an officer thrust into an under-resourced civilian agency deserves fairness. In public governance, however, grace is no substitute for timely accountability. For the thousands of Jamaicans across South Manchester, St Elizabeth, Westmoreland, Clarendon, Hanover, St James and Trelawny whose roofs remained uncovered while $200 million in building materials vanished into an accounting fog, promises of December 2026 reconciliation spreadsheets arrive far too late. For families watching donated food spoil in warehouses while household budgets buckled under post-storm inflation, administrative contrition thirteen months after the event offers cold comfort.


Breaking the Habit of Executive Laziness

A wise Cabinet governs through institutions, not around them. True executive leadership does not consist of endlessly shuffling a small circle of trusted military commanders from one civilian crisis to the next—from policing to immigration, from intelligence to disaster relief—whilst leaving the underlying civilian machinery unrepaired. That is not transformation; it is slow-marching on one square. It creates the comforting appearance of action at Jamaica House while allowing systemic vulnerabilities to fester beneath the surface.


If Prime Minister Holness and his Cabinet wish to honour both the Jamaican taxpayer and the distinguished officers of the Jamaica Defence Force, they must break this habit of administrative laziness and restore constitutional and professional boundaries:

  1. Return ODPEM to civilian technical leadership and statutory independence. Reassigning the agency back to an appropriate portfolio ministry—rather than housing it inside the Office of the Prime Minister—and recruiting an experienced civilian disaster-risk and humanitarian supply-chain specialist as Director General will restore clear lines of oversight and parliamentary scrutiny.

  2. Keep the JDF in its proper, vital constitutional lane. Let our soldiers do what they do best: provide unmatched engineering, air-and-sea lift, search-and-rescue, and perimeter security under a unified civilian incident command, without burdening officers with civilian procurement audits and social-welfare administration.

  3. Rebuild the civilian bench before the next storm. Invest seriously in the career civil servants, parish disaster committees, and forensic inventory systems that form the backbone of national resilience—so that when the next hurricane forms in the Atlantic, accountability is built into every pallet before it leaves the wharf, rather than promised in an apology a year later.

Jamaica does not lack bright soldiers, nor does it lack brilliant civilian scientists, logisticians, and administrators. What it has lacked at the Cabinet table is the wisdom to deploy each within their true sphere of mastery—and the foresight to know that without strong civilian roots, even the sharpest uniform cannot keep the weevils out of the rice.
P.S. My late wife, Sandra Morrison-Minott, and the late Barbara Roache-Clarke were among the pioneers of disaster management in Jamaica. Both held senior leadership positions at the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM), serving as Deputy Director General and Acting Director General. For years, they also taught emergency management at the university level.

I can almost hear them groaning at this parade of misplaced expertise—and at the entirely avoidable foolishness flowing from the Holness-era Cabinet’s NaRRA-style approach: retired elite JDF “Military-Love-Cash” interests first; disaster victims second. Meanwhile, there are weevils in storm-victims’ rice, and delays drag on more than thirteen months after Hurricane Melissa.


But never mind all that. Do your “civic duty”: diss and cuss out Beenie Man, L-------s. Next up: a billboard fi NaRRA—Tony Andy’s “slackiss” Jamaican dancehall queen gal in one rahtid number 1 hit. DI song "dis ah dub-it inna Missa Desmond lickle head".

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